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Abstract : Capacity market provides additional revenue 
stream for the power suppliers. In a capacity-energy combined 
market environment, suppliers have incentives to deliberately 
over-offer their capacities in the capacity market while bid very 
high price in the energy and ancillary markets to avoid operation. 
This paper analyzes the risks and profits of this capacity-over-
offer behavior, and develops a method for computing non-
operable penalty level which can prevent the capacity-over-offer 
behavior. It is found that the effective penalty level is highly 
correlated with the stochastic characteristics of the supplier’s 
profit streams and attitudes towards risk. Two types of suppliers 
are identified with high potential of capacity cheating behavior in 
the analysis. The methodology and the results are potentially 
useful for regulating participants’ misbehaviors and enhancing 
the operation security in a capacity-energy market environment. 
Index Terms: capacity market; volume cheat; risk 
management; Prospect Theory; Monte-Carlo simulation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Capacity market is one approach to address the long-term 
generation resource adequacy problem. In northeast US, 
capacity markets have been in operation for almost ten years. 
Capacity market is an explicit mechanism for pricing resource 
reliability, which yields an explicit/separate price signal for 
generation investment. A capacity market also provides 
generators with additional revenue stream besides 
energy/ancillary markets. These revenues are important for 
peaking generators which have “missing money” problem 
[1][2][3]. The disadvantage of capacity market approach is its 
administrative essence. Some argue that creating capacity 
markets will delay the development of a sufficient demand 
response, which is the right way to ultimately address 
resource adequacy problem. They believe in other approaches, 
such as forward contracts and call options to ensure 
generation investment [4][5][6][7].  
In a capacity-energy combined market environment, the 
strategies of power suppliers will be different from those in 
the energy-only market environment, due to the change of 
their money streams.  
In this paper, we focus on issues in capacity-energy 
combined market environment. The capacity requirement is 
calculated by the forecasted peak load plus a certain margin, 
therefore, the generation capacities cleared in the capacity 
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market is always higher than the real peak load. Then, a lot of 
generation capacities will not operate indeed. Therefore, 
suppliers may cheatingly offer more capacity than they 
actually have, and bid high price in the energy market to avoid 
dispatch. This strategy can bring generators additional 
revenue without costs, but may cause serious operation 
problems for the system operator. 
From a supplier’s viewpoint, over-offering can bring 
additional revenue stream, but on the other hand, this strategy 
may also incur penalty when disclosed as non-operable in 
reality. The real peak load during the capacity period can be 
much higher than predicted. Moreover, other circumstances 
such as the outage of a large generator, the emergency start 
need from a local blackout, may also require unexpected 
activation of the cheating capacity, no matter how high their 
bidding price in the energy/reserve market is. When called for 
operation and revealed as non-operable, the cheating supplier 
will suffer the penalty. 
Therefore, whether the strategy of over-offering is 
profitable depends on a number of factors, including the non-
operable penalty level, the load forecast accuracy, the 
probability of potential operation, the capacity market price, 
the system capacity adequacy requirement and the risk 
attitudes of the suppliers. 
This paper analyzes the potential return and associated risk 
of the over-offering strategy, as well as their relationship with 
the above factors. The motivation is to find a penalty 
mechanism that can make this strategy less profitable and 
more risky for the potential cheaters to exercise. 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section II 
first analyzes the risks and profits of this capacity-over-offer 
behavior, and then develops a method of computing non-
operable penalty level which can prevent the capacity-over-
offer behavior of suppliers with different risk attitudes. In 
Section III, simulation results of three different types of 
suppliers are presented and discussed, it is found that risk-
neutral penalty level can be either too high or too low for 
suppliers with different cash streams. In Section IV, some 
conclusions are drawn. 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
In this section, the profits and risks of the capacity-over-
offer behavior are analyzed and the methods for setting non-
operable penalty level under different risk attitudes are 
developed. This section consists of three subsections, 
Subsection A focuses on formulating the random 
characteristics of the money stream of the capacity-over-offer 
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behavior. Subsection B deduces the analytical form of a 
penalty level which can prevent capacity-over-offer behavior 
for risk-neutral participants. Subsection C develops a penalty 
setting algorithm for risk-averse and risk-loving participants. 
A.  Formulating effective penalty mechanism  
Assume a supplier offer x (MW) cheating capacity in the 
capacity market. It will receive Cp x⋅%  extra revenue, where 
Cp%  denotes the capacity price. Since the supplier should 
decide x before the capacity market clears, Cp%  has 
uncertainty, so an upper-swung-dash is used to express that 
capacity price is a random variable.  
Therefore the profit of over-offering can be formulated as: 
c Cp x Bπ = ⋅ − %% %               (1) 
where B%  denotes the total penalty ($) the cheater will suffer. 
The term B%  is related with the amount of cheating capacity 
which will be exposed, here we use ( , )y x t%  to denote the 
exposed capacity in operation interval t when offering x 
cheating capacity. Then we have: 
1
M( ( , ))
TOI
t
B y x t
=
=
∑
%
%              (2) 
where M( )•  denotes the penalty mechanism. 
The next step is to formulate ( , )y x t% . The formulation of  
( , )y x t%  may differ significantly given different market designs 
and operation rules. Usually, the exposed capacity ( , )y x t%  is 
correlated with scarcity/shortage pricing mechanisms in 
operation. For adequacy and security concern, electricity 
markets/power systems normally have a certain form of 
scarcity/shortage pricing mechanisms, which will be effective 
in tight supply-demand conditions. The scarcity/shortage 
pricing mechanisms usually require all available system 
capacities to be activated and compensated at a predetermined 
price (often very high, close to the VOLL value) if called for 
operation. Scarcity pricing programs in different electricity 
markets are triggered by different conditions. Here we simply 
assume that the scarcity pricing program is triggered by the 
demand level, when demand exceeds a threshold level D , all 
the capacities in the system will be under central operation 
and receive an administrative price SCp  for each MW 
generation. 
Under this scarcity pricing program, ( , )y x t%  can be 
classified into three situations. When demand is less than the 
scarcity threshold, or ( )D t D≤% , cheating capacity has no risk 
to be exposed, or ( , ) 0y x t =% ; when demand is higher than the 
total system capacity, or ( )D t C≥% , all cheating capacity will 
be called for operation, or ( )y t x=% ; when demand lies 
between scarcity threshold and system capacity, or 
( )D D t C< <% , certain amount of cheating capacity has certain 
probability of exposure, or  ( )y t%  is a random variable 
following the hypergeometric distribution. 
Therefore, ( , )y x t%  can be formulated as: 
0 , ( )
( , ) ( ( ) , , ) , ( )
, ( )
D t D
y x t H D t D x C D D D t C
x D t C
⎧ ≤
⎪= − − < <
⎨
⎪ ≥
⎩
%
% %
%

%
   (3) 
where ( , , )H α β τ denotes the hypergeometric distribution 
function with the parameters α , β  and τ . Here 
( )D t Dα = −% , xβ = , ( )C D tτ = − % . Intuitively, this means 
choosing ( )D t D−%  from all the available capacity C D− , in 
which x  is cheating. 
The hypergeometric distribution implies that the possibility 
of disclosing y MW cheating capacity follows:  
( )
( )
( )
( )
P( ( , ) )
!( ( ) )!( 2 ( ) )!( ( ) )!
( )! !( 2 ( ) )!( ( ) )!( ( ))!
y D t D y
x C D t x
D t D
C D t
C C
y x t y
C
x C D t x C D t D D t D
x y y C D t D x y D t D y C D t
− −
− −
−
−
⋅= =
− − − ⋅ + −= − − + − + − − −
%
%
%
%
%
% % %
% % %
(4) 
 Substitute (3) and (2) into (1), we can get the analytical 
formulation of the cheating profit: 
1
M( ( , ))
TOI
c C
t
p x y x tπ
=
= ⋅ −
∑
% % %               (5) 
where ( , )y x t%  follows (3). 
The classical method to compare the preference of random 
money stream is the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) [9]. It is 
assumed in EUT that an investor’s objective is to maximize 
the expected utility, i.e., the expected value of his utility 
function. Based on EUT, the problem of over-offer prevention 
can be expressed as: 
Finding an optimal mechanism *M ( )• , to ensure 0x∀ > , 
0, , 0, ,E[U( )] E[U( )]i n i c i n iW Wπ π π+ + < +% % %        (6) 
To show the penalty mechanism explicitly, (6) can be 
rewritten as: 
0, , 0, ,
1
E[U( M( ))] E[U( )]
TOI
i n i C i n i
t
W p x y Wπ π
=
+ + ⋅ − < +
∑
% % % %   (7) 
Inequality (7) is the criteria for an effective penalty 
mechanism. Here E[ ]•  denotes the mathematical expectation, 
U( )•  denotes the utility function, 0, iW  is the wealth level of 
supplier i when making the decision (or initial endowment), 
generally, 0, iW  can be formulated as: 
0, i i iW A L= −                   (8) 
where iA  denotes the present value of total assets, iL  denotes 
the present value of total liabilities. 
,n iπ%  denotes the normal profit of supplier i. The normal 
profit is a random variable based on the prices of energy and 
ancillary services. For example, the normal profit of a thermal 
generator j participating in capacity market, spot energy 
market, fixed contract and reactive power may read as: 
, ,f ( )n j C j FC FC SP SP Q j c j FC SPp C p P p P p Q P Pπ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − +% % % (9) 
. . FC SP js t P P C+ ≤                 (10) 
2 2( )FC SP j t aP P Q V I+ + ≤ ⋅             (11) 
where FCP  and SPP  denotes the generation in fixed contract 
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and spot market, jQ  denotes the supply of reactive power, jC  
denotes the capacity of the generator, tV   denotes the voltage 
at the generator terminal bus, aI  denotes the steadystate 
armature current, ,f ( )c j •  denotes the cost function, the most 
widely used forms are linear and quadratic cost functions. 
Equations (9)-(11) demonstrate a simple example of 
modeling suppliers’ normal profit and associated constraints. 
A more complicated model can include incomes from other 
ancillary services and more deliberately multi-trading 
strategies [10]. 
B.  Deducing Risk Neutral Secure Penalty 
The solution of the problem of preventing over-offer, or 
optimal penalty *M ( )•  could have various forms. Within 
them, the commonly applied mechanism is to penalize each 
unit of inoperable capacity by a fixed penalty b, or, 
M( )y b y= ⋅% % , then (7) can be written as: 
0, , 0, ,
1
E[U( E[ ]] E[U( )]
TOI
i n i C i n i
t
W p x b y Wπ π
=
+ + ⋅ − ⋅ < +
∑
% % % %  (12) 
 Generally, the lowest secure penalty level can be expressed 
as: 
0 , 0 ,
1
,  0 :
inf
E( ) E( ) E( ) E( )
TOI
n i C n i
t
b x
b
W p x b y Wπ π
=
∈ ∀ >
⎧ ⎫
⎪ ⎪=
⎨ ⎬+ + ⋅ − ⋅ ≤ +
⎪ ⎪
⎩ ⎭
∑
 
% % % %
(13) 
where { }inf •  denotes the inferior limit.  
For risk-neutral suppliers, we can have a more attractive 
form of b . Notice that U( )•  is monotonically increasing, and 
for a risk-neutral supplier, E[U( )] U(E[ ])W W=% % . Therefore, 
condition (12) can be rewritten as: 
0 , 0 ,
1
E[ ] E[ ] E[ ] E[ ]
TOI
n i C n i
t
W p x b y Wπ π
=
+ + ⋅ − ⋅ < +
∑
% % % %    (14) 
Or equivalently: 
1
E[ ] E[ ] 0
TOI
C
t
p x b y
=
⋅ − ⋅ <
∑
% %              (15) 
Notice that: 
E[ ]
( )
Pr( ( ) ) 0 Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) )
( )
( )
Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) )
( )
( )
Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) )
( )
y
D t D
D t D D D t C x x D t C
C D t
D t D
D D t C x x D t C
C D t
D t D
D D t C D t C x
C D t
−= ≤ ⋅ + < < ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ≥−
−= < < ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ≥−
⎧ ⎫−= < < ⋅ + ≥ ⋅
⎨ ⎬−
⎩ ⎭
%
%
% % %
%
%
% %
%
%
% %
%
(16) 
Substitute (16) into (15), we have: 
1
( )
E[ ] Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) ) 0
( )
TOI
C
t
D t D
p b D D t C D t C x
C D t=
⎧ ⎫
⎧ ⎫−
⎪ ⎪− ⋅ < < ⋅ + ≥ ⋅ <
⎨ ⎨ ⎬⎬−
⎪ ⎪
⎩ ⎭
⎩ ⎭
∑
%
% %
%
%
(17) 
since 0x > , (17) is equivalent to: 
1
( )
E[ ] Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) ) 0
( )
TOI
C
t
D t D
p b D D t C D t C
C D t=
⎧ ⎫−− ⋅ < < ⋅ + ≥ <
⎨ ⎬−
⎩ ⎭
∑
%
% %
%
%
or: 
1
( )
E[ ] / Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) )
( )
TOI
C
t
D t D
b p D D t C D t C
C D t=
⎧ ⎫−> < < ⋅ + ≥
⎨ ⎬−
⎩ ⎭
∑
%
% %
%
%
(18) 
Hence, the lower limit of non-operable penalty level which 
can prevent risk-neutral participants’ capacity-over-offer 
behavior has been obtained. In this paper, RNb  is used to 
denote this level, then we have: 
1
( )
E( ) / Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) )
( )
TOI
RN C
t
D t D
b p D D t C D t C
C D t=
⎧ ⎫−= < < ⋅ + ≥
⎨ ⎬−
⎩ ⎭
∑
%
% %
%
%
(19) 
 A penalty higher than RNb  can ensure that any risk-neutral 
supplier suffers a loss when bid a non-zero cheating capacity 
in the capacity market. Therefore, a rational risk-neutral 
supplier will not cheat in the capacity market under RNb  
penalty. In this aspect, we call RNb  the risk-neutral-secure 
penalty (RNS penalty). 
We can notice that RNb  depends only on the expectation of 
capacity market price E[ ]Cp% , demand level ( )D t% , scarcity 
threshold D  and system capacity level C , but NOT relates to 
,n iπ%  or iC  or any other individual parameters of supplier i. In 
other words, one control area requires only one uniform RNS 
penalty to prevent cheating behavior, rather than requires 
different penalty levels for different suppliers. 
C.  Analysis for more diverse risk-attitudes 
In the above subsection, the minimal penalty level of a risk-
neutral supplier is deduced. This RNS penalty can ensure the 
rational risk-neutral supplier to behave honesty in the capacity 
market. 
However, the risk-neutral assumption is too strong for all 
suppliers at all times. Risk-neutrality equivalently means that 
all suppliers concern only about their expected profit no 
matter what the risk is. This is not always the situation, some 
suppliers do concern about their risks. The more general case 
is that suppliers concern about their expected profit as well as 
the associated risk. Therefore, this RNS penalty may be too 
high or too low for risk-averse and risk-loving suppliers. 
The most widely accepted theorem concerning risk 
attitudes is the Prospect Theory 1 . Prospect Theory by 
experimental methodology discovered that decision-makers 
are risk-averse for gains and risk-loving for losses. Readers 
can refer to [8] for more details about Prospect Theory. 
In electricity markets, most suppliers are making money, so 
they perform risk-averse in decision-making. Base-load/ 
intermediate suppliers will not offer cheating capacity under 
the RNS penalty, because cheating capacity will include an 
extra volatility to their stable normal revenue stream. Under 
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the RNS penalty, the cheating behavior is highly risky. If 
seldom called for operation, the cheating behavior will not be 
exposed and cheating supplier will receive extra pay from the 
capacity market with no fixed or variable cost. But if 
frequently called for operation, the cheating capacity can 
incur huge amount of penalty. This “gambling” behavior is 
hence not preferred by risk-averse base-load suppliers. 
There are two types of potential cheaters. The first type is 
the profit-losing base-load/intermediate suppliers. They are 
risk-loving and inclined to take a more risky strategy such as 
the cheating behavior. 
The second type is profit-making peaking-load suppliers 
(peakers), because their normal profit is negatively correlated 
with their cheating profit. When the real demand is higher 
than expected, peakers will generate more and gain more 
normal profit; meanwhile their cheating profit will also be 
lower than expected, because the probability of disclosure of 
their cheating bidding will be higher than expected due to the 
high demand. When the real demand is lower than expected, 
peakers will generate less and gain less normal profit, 
meanwhile the probability of the potential penalty is also less, 
resulting in more cheating profit. In this manner, peakers’ 
normal profit is negatively correlated with their cheating 
profit and the total profit (the cheating plus normal profit) will 
be more stable. This stable revenue stream is preferable for 
risk-averse suppliers, even though the expected profit is 
theoretically the same under RNS penalty. Therefore, peakers 
will more probably (than baseload suppliers) offer a certain 
amount of cheating capacity in the capacity market, to 
stabilize their money stream. 
The general model for extracting a secure penalty level 
under various risk attitudes is formulated as the following:  
min max
b i
b                    (20) 
0, , 0 ,
1
. . 0 , E[U( )] E[U( )]
TOI
i n i C n i
t
s t x x W p x b y Wπ π
=
∀ ≤ ≤ + + ⋅ − ⋅ < +
∑
% % % %
(21) 
The risk-averse/ risk-loving degree is implied in the 
concavity/convexity of the utility function U( )• . If the utility 
function is concave, it embodies risk-averse. If the utility 
function is convex, it embodies risk-loving. 
Here, since U( )•  is nonlinear, E[U( )] U(E[ ])W W≠% % , the 
random variables 0S% , Cp%  and ( )y t% s can not be easily 
decoupled and it is impossible to derive an analytical form of 
secure-penalty. 
However, (20)-(21) can still be solved through numerical 
algorithms. In this paper, we use a Monte-Carlo simulation to 
obtain numerical solutions of secure penalty under general 
risk attitudes. The Flow Chart of the proposed algorithm is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1.  Flow Chart of the Proposed Algorithm (I: number of suppliers; x: upper 
limit of cheating capacity; B: upper limit of penalty level) 
 
III.  TESTING RESULTS 
In the previous section, the problem of participant’s 
cheating behavior is formulated, the analytical form of secure 
penalty under risk-neutral assumption is deduced and a 
simulation algorithm for calculating secure penalty under 
general risk attitudes is developed. 
The previous section also pointed out two potential cheaters. 
In this section, the proposed approaches for calculating a 
secure penalty will be tested based on real market data. The 
expected value and volatility of different suppliers’ cheating 
and normal profit will be compared. 
Assume there are three GenCos in the market. GenCoA 
owns two 100MW gas-fueled peaking generators. Due to the 
high gas price, his strategy is to generate only in the scarcity 
intervals.  
GenCoB owns a 300MW coal-fired generator. Due to its 
very low fuel cost and high startup cost, its strategy is to 
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generate full capacity as continuously as possible. So it has 
signed fixed price contract with full capacity.  
GenCoC owns a 100MW off-shore wind farm. It has no 
fuel cost and little operation cost. Most of its cost comes from 
the annualized depreciation charge. But the rise of the cost of 
anti-corrosion coatings caused by the soaring crude oil price 
results in the unexpected high maintenance cost.  
 In this section, the cost of the GenCos are divided as three 
parts, depreciation charge Dc , which is assumed fixed and 
calculated as $/MWy, Operation and Maintenance cost OMc  
which is assumed fixed and calculated as $/MWy, and the fuel 
cost Fc , which depends on the output (MW) and calculated as 
$/MWh. 
 Based on the above setup, the normal profit of the three 
GenCos are formulated as: 
, , , ,
1
( ) ( )
TOI
n A C A D A OM A s F B
t
p C c c p c z tπ
=
= ⋅ − − + − ⋅
∑
% %
%  
, , , , , ,( )n B C B D B OM B FC B F B B O Bp C c c p c C Tπ = ⋅ − − + − ⋅ ⋅% %  
, , , ,
1
( ( ) ) ( )
TOI
n C C C D C OM C SP F C
t
p C c c p t c P tπ
=
= ⋅ − − + − ⋅
∑
% %  
where 
0 , ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( ) , , ( )) , ( )
, ( )
i
i
D t D
z t z t H D t D C C D t D D t C
C D t C
⎧ ≤
⎪= − − < <
⎨
⎪ ≥
⎩
%
% % %
% %

%
  
For comparison, it is assumed that (1) the present value of 
assets minus liabilities, or 0, iW  of the three suppliers are the 
same; (2) the utility functions of the three suppliers are the 
same, shown as: 
0 0
0 0
3 ( ) /
0
3 ( ) /
0
1 ,
U( )
1,
W W W
W W W
e W W
W
e W W
− ⋅ −
⋅ −
⎧ − ≥
⎪=
⎨ − <
⎪
⎩
%
%
%
%
%
         (22) 
where 0 n cW W π π= + +% % % . This utility function denotes risk-
averse in gain and risk-loving in loss. 
In this simulation, the parameters are set as: 
6
0, 0, 0, 3 10 $A B CW W W= = = × , 1000$ /SCp MWh= , 
, 7000O BT = , 200AC MW= , 300BC MW= , 100CC MW= , 
, 50$ /FC Ap MWh= , , 20000$ /D Ac MWy=
, 40000$ /D Bc MWy= , , 60000$ / ,D Cc MWy=
, 10000$ /OM Ac MWy= , , 20000$ /OM Bc MWy=
, 30000$ /OM Cc MWy= , , 60$ /F Ac MWh= , , 45$ /F Bc MWh=
, 0$ /F Cc MWh= . 
 From (19), the risk-neutral secure penalty level can be 
calculated. The result is 1325RNb = . 
 However, if RNb  is used for penalty level, GenCoA and 
GenCoC will choose the cheating strategy. Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and 
Fig. 4 show the utilities of normal profits of GenCoA, 
GenCoB and GenCoC, respectively. We can see that the 
optimal strategy for GenCoA is to offer 13MW cheating 
capacity in the capacity market and for GenCoC is to offer 
30MW cheating capacity. While for GenCoB, the optimal 
strategy is not to offer any cheating capacity. 
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Fig. 2  Utility-x, GenCoA 
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Fig. 3  Utility-x, GenCoB 
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Fig. 4  Utility-x, GenCoC 
 
 We can find from (19) that the expected profit is always the 
same under RNb  whatever the cheating capacity is. Then why 
the utility differs significantly under different cheating 
capacity? The answer exists in the risks. Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 
7 depict the variance and Value at Risk (VaR) of GenCoA, 
GenCoB and GenCoC.  
VaR is percentile-based measure, defined as 
{ }c : Prob( ) 1VaR =inf L Loss L c∈ Δ < ≤ −  , where Prob( )•  denotes 
conditional probability function, LossΔ  denotes the potential 
loss,  and c  denotes the confidence level (set as 95% here).  
We can see in Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 that although 
variance and VaR are totally different risk measures, they 
represent almost the same shapes when cheating capacity 
varies. GenCoA initially can lower its risk by offering more 
cheating capacity, but after 13 MW, its risk will rise with 
more cheating capacity. The minimal risk point (13MW) is 
the same with the maximal utility point (13MW). The risk of 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Danmarks Tekniske Informationscenter. Downloaded on February 3, 2010 at 07:59 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
 6
GenCoB and GenCoC will always rise by offering more 
cheating capacity. But while GenCoB’s wealth is at the risk-
averse section and GenCoC’s wealth is at the risk-loving 
section of the utility function, their optimal cheating 
capacities are 0MW and 30MW, respectively. 
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Fig. 5  Risk-x, Peaker 
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Fig. 6  Risk-x, BaseGen 
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Fig. 7  Risk-x, LosingMoneyGen 
 
The next question is why GenCoA can lower its risk by 
offering more cheating capacity while GenCoB and GenCoC 
can not? 
To answer this question, we can take a closer look at the 
probability distribution of their profits before and after 
cheating, or nπ%  and n cπ π+% % . Fig. 8 compare the distributions 
of pre-cheating (normal) profit and post-cheating 
(normal+cheating) profit of GenCoA, at the optimal cheating 
capacity 13MW. We can see that the post-cheating profit is 
significantly less widely distributed than the pre-cheating 
profit. In other words, the cheating profit partly hedged the 
risk in normal profit. The correlation coefficient between 
normal profit and cheating profit is -0.9819. 
For GenCoB and GenCoC, the correlation between normal 
profit and cheating profit are all close to zero, 0.0018 and 
0.0033 respectively. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show the distribution 
of GenCoB and GenCoC, we can see that the cheating 
behavior significantly increases the volatility of their profit 
stream. 
To ensure these three GenCos all abandon the cheating 
behavior. The algorithm described in Fig.1 can be used to 
calculate the penalty level. The result is that penalty level 
should be lifted to 1482$/MWh, where 1396$/MWh can 
ensure GenCoA’s non-cheating and 1482$/MWh can ensure 
GenCoC’s non-cheating. 
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Fig. 8  Comparison between Sample Distribution of GenCoA’s Profits before 
and post cheating 
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Fig. 9  Comparison between Sample Distribution of GenCoB’s Profits before 
and post cheating 
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Fig. 10  Comparison between Sample Distribution of GenCoC’s Profits Before 
and Post Cheating 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the strategy of capacity-over-offer is 
analyzed. For preventing this potentially threatening behavior, 
the analytical form of risk-neutral non-operable penalty is 
deduced. An analysis including the correlation between 
cheating profit and normal profit, as well as the risk attitudes 
is conducted. A Monte-Carlo simulation embedded computer 
program was developed for solving the problem. The results 
suggest that profit-losing base-load/intermediate suppliers and 
the profit-making peaking-load suppliers still have incentives 
to over-offer in the capacity market under risk-neutral penalty 
level. Although the penalty mechanism and the scarcity 
pricing mechanism adopted in this work are simplified, the 
methodology suggested is rather general.  
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